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INTRODUCTION
Through either executive or legislative power, state and local governments are rapidly effecting policies that encourage environmental
sustainability. Many of these policies have logically targeted buildings
and infrastructure, both of which have a significant adverse impact on
the environment. In the United States, 38 percent of the nation's carbon dioxide emissions and 67 percent of its electricity usage come from
buildings .2 New laws and policies are attempting to decrease these
figures by requiring construction projects to "go green" and implement
sustainable building practices. These legal initiatives have the potential to create substantial environmental benefits by reducing energy
consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and toxic waste. But in a rush
to achieve these benefits, many governments have enacted green building laws that lack a firm constitutional basis.
This Article explores the constitutionality of green building laws
that require developers to comply with the sustainable construction rating system promulgated by the United States Green Building Council
("USGBC"), a private, non-governmental interest group. The Article
1 J.D. 2011, William and Mary School of Law; B.A. 2005, magna cum laude, University of
Richmond. Beginning this fall, Mr. Boxler will clerk for Judge Edward Earl Carnes on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Special thanks to Jill for her endless support and the
editors of the Legislation & Policy Brief for their hard work preparing this piece for publication.
2
Frequent Questions / Green Building, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
greenbuilding/pubs/faqs.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2011).
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reviews how the USGBC creates the standards for its rating system
and then modifies these standards without gaining approval from any
governmental body, thereby changing the legal rules with which private citizens and constructors must comply. The Article argues that,
because the USGBC can unilaterally change the law, many green building policies undermine political accountability and violate the doctrine
of nondelegation. The Article concludes by proposing several ways
that governments can enact green building policies without unconstitutionally delegating legislative power or circumventing principles of
democratic governance.
1. INCREASED ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS
The environmental conservation movement is booming.
Documentaries such as former Vice President Al Gore's An Inconvenient
Truth have contributed to the movement's momentum, and grassroots
lobbying has also played a significant role in giving the movement
mainstream appeal . 3 Environmentalist interest groups are well organized, and their ability to mobilize supporters has given them substantial influence over the political process .4 In recent years, this influence
has grown as environmentalists have supplemented grassroots lobbying with a more traditional and perhaps more powerful technique:
campaign contributions. In 2004, environmental interest groups
contributed $2.2 million to political candidates; in 2008, that number
jumped to $5.5 million. 5
A recent development in the environmental conservation movement is the push for legislation that encourages or mandates "green
building," which "is the practice of creating structures and using processes that are environmentally responsible ...." 6 Green buildings
are designed to diminish their adverse environmental impact by "efficiently using energy, water, and other resources ." To achieve these
goals, engineers and constructors use sustainable materials and imple'

3 ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PROCESS, PARTICIPATION, AND
POWER IN STATE LEGISLATURES 230 (1988).
4 Id.
5
Environment: Long-Term Contribution Trends , CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.
opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2010&ind=Q11 (last visited Apr. 22, 2011). Ninetyfive percent of the political contributions in 2008 went to Democrats. Id.
6 Basic Information / Green Building , ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
greenbuilding/pubs/about.htm#1 (last visited Apr. 21, 2011).
Id. ; see also Christopher P. Perzan, Environmental Protection: What You Should Know About Green
Building, 20 CHI. BAR ASS'N REC. 38, 39 (Nov. 2006) ("Green design, whether in the context of
building construction, product design manufacturing, or some other area, is design that seeks to
maximize energy efficiency, minimize resource use and waste production, reduce or eliminate
toxic materials in building components, and reduce the overall impact of the building on the
environment.").
'
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ment advanced technologies to build and maintain structures with
minimal waste a
Similar to the broader environmentalist movement, the popularity
of green building is growing. 9 In 2005, the market for green building products and services was approximately $7 billion. 10 This number is expected to increase to more than $173.5 billion by the end of
201511 —a remarkable 2,379 percent increase in only 10 years. Some
of this growth is due to an unprecedented level of governmental initiatives that promote or mandate green construction, often passed at
the urging of the environmentalist lobby. 12 All but one of the twentyfive most populated metropolitan regions in the United States are now
built around cities with formal green building policies, 13 and all but
five states have adopted initiatives to encourage sustainable construc-

I

See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the
States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 241-42 (2008).
9 See, e.g., David Knopf, Green Homebuilding Gaining Popularity Among Consumers, Builders, Experts
Say, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 20, 2008, at LB5 (discussing growth in the green home marketplace); see
also Erin Madison, Commercial Buildings More Energy-Efficient as the Greening of Great Falls Blossoms ,
GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Mont.), at B1, Nov. 22, 2009, available at http://www.greatfallstribune.com/
article/20091122/BUSINESS/911220304/Commercial+buildings+more+energy-efficient+as+the+gr
eening+of+Great+Falls+blossoms (describing how "[g]reen commercial construction is becoming
increasingly popular").
10
About USGBC , USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=124 (last visited
Apr. 22, 2011).
11
Green Building Market To Hit $173.5 Billion by 2015 , ENVTL. LEADER, July 1, 2010, http://www.
environmentalleader.com/2010/07/01/green-building-market-to-hit-173-5-billion-by-2015/;
cf. The Green Building Market and Impact Report 2009 , GREENBUILDINGS.COM, Nov. 5, 2009, http://
www.greenbiz.com/buildings/research/report/2009/11/05/green-building-market-and-impactreport-2009 ("Green building activity has sustained impressive growth during 2009, amid a
brutal construction market that has decimated other segments of the construction marketplace.").
See generally Keith H. Hirokawa, At Home with Nature: Early Reflections on Green Building Laws
and the Transformation of the Built Environment , 39 ENVTL. L. 507, 509-10 (2009) (noting that the
rise in popularity of the "green building movement" has exceeded "virtually all predictions and
expectations of its potential").
12
See, e.g. , 2009 Conservation LobbyDay , MO. VOTES CONSERVATION, http://www.movotesconservation.
org/lobbyday.aspx (last visited July 29, 2010) (discussing a "Conservation Lobby Day" where
environmentalist groups lobbied over ninety state legislators to support conservationist policies,
including green building laws); ECRI Legislative Priorities for 2009 in the RI General Assembly , ENV^T
COUNCIL R.I., http://www.environmentcouncilri.org/news.html (last visited July 30, 2010) (listing
"Promote Green Buildings" as a lobbying priority for the upcoming legislative session). But see
Bronin, supra note 7, at 260 (arguing that local interest groups, such as unions and manufacturers
of conventional building materials, may prevent city governments from enacting green building
policies).
13
American Cities Embrace Green Buildings , ENV'T NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.ensnewswire.com/ens/nov2009/2009-11-16-091.asp; cf. BROOKS RAINWATER, AM. INST. ARCHITECTS,
LOCAL LEADERS IN SUSTAINABILITY: A STUDY OF GREEN BUILDING PROGRAMS IN OUR NATION'S
COMMUNITIES 4 (2008), available at http://green.e-arc.com/images/Green-Building-Study.pdf
(reporting that at least 14 percent of all cities with populations over 50,000 have green building
programs).
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tion practices. 14 Put simply, the country is in the middle of a "green
building revolution." 15
11. THE LEED RATING SYSTEM
In response to the increased public and political interest in sustainable construction, several organizations formed to standardize
and promote green building techniques. None has been more influential than the USGBC, 16 a private non-profit organization based in
Washington, D.C. 17 The USGBC promulgates an internationally recognized set of standards for environmentally sustainable construction called the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green
Building Rating System ("LEED"). 18 A building may achieve one of
four hierarchical LEED ratings —"Certificate Level" to "Platinum
Level" —depending on the amount of points it receives. 19 Builders earn
points by incorporating green construction and design strategies into a
project's completion. 20
Gaining LEED certification is not easy. Green technologies often cost
more than the materials traditionally used on construction projects, 21
and green builders must pay additional design, consulting, and certification fees to achieve a LEED rating . 22 Depending on the level of
certification sought, these added costs range from one to ten percent,
which can mean millions of dollars for larger commercial projects. 23
The payoff, however, can also be significant. 24 Research indicates that
14 See Public Policies Adopting or Referencing LEED , USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage .
aspx?CMSPageID=1852 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (proffering that forty-five states have LEED
initiatives, including "legislation, executive orders, resolutions, ordinances, policies, and
incentives").
15
See Susan Carpenter, Al Gore Calls fora Green Building Revolution , L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, http://
latimesblogs.latimes.com/home_blog/2009/11/al-gore-calls-for-a-green-building-revolution.html
(describing a speech by the Vice President calling for a green revolution).
16
See Perzan, supra note 6, at 39; see also Brian D. Anderson, Legal and Business Issues of Green
Building, 79 Wis. LAw.10,12 (2006) ("[T]he USGBC has virtually cornered the market on the rating
of green commercial buildings.").
17 USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2011)
11
Perzan, supra note 6, at 39 ("The USGBC has established a set of standards known as the ...
LEED."); see also Anderson, supra note 15, at 12-13 (detailing the creation of LEED).
19 USGBC, LEED 2009 FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR RENOVATIONS vii (2009).
20
Id. at vi-vii; see also Perzan, supra note 6, at 39 (discussing the point categories of the LEED
rating system).
21
Benjamin S. Kingsley, Note, Making it Easy To Be Green: Using Impact Fees To Encourage Green
Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532, 538-40 (2008).
22
Id. at 539.
23
Id.
24
See Perzan, supra note 6, at 39 (discussing how the cost savings of green buildings, such as
improved energy efficiency, "can help developers recoup the initial costs over a fairly short period
of time"); see also Stuart D. Kaplow, Does a Green Building Need a Green Lease?, 38 U. BALT. L. REv.
375, 377-79 (2009) (noting that LEED buildings can command a higher rental rate and sell for more
money per square foot than non-LEED properties, and explaining the "dollars and cents case" to
justify construction of green buildings).
.
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LEED certification improves a building's value, long-term operating
expenses, and occupancy rates. 25
Due in part to these long-term cost savings, many private companies became interested in green buildings around the turn of the
twenty-first century when the USGBC first published the LEED rating system. 26 Another, more cynical reason for this interest was the
positive publicity that attends green building projects. 27 Companies
recognized that constructing LEED-certified buildings often attracted
favorable media attention that could improve their corporate images.
In addition to creating workplaces that were certified to be "environmentally responsible, profitable, and healthy," businesses also gained
new marketing tools to sell their corporate brand to consumers who
were becoming increasingly environmentally aware. 28 By 2003, businesses such as the Ford Motor Company and Warner Brothers were
vying for the honor and publicity of constructing "the world's greenest
building." 29
111. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
It did not take long for lawmakers to recognize the fiscal, public
relations, and political advantages of supporting and ultimately enact25

See Stephen T. Del Percio, Comment, The Skyscraper, Green Design, & the LEED Green Building
Rating System: The Creation of Uniform Sustainable Standards for the 21st Century or the Perpetuation
of an Architectural Fiction?, 28 ENVIRONS. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J.117, 135-36 (2004); see also Andrew C.
Burr, CoStar Study Finds Energy Start, LEED Bldgs. Outperform Peers, COSTAR GROUP, Mar. 26, 2008,
http://www.costar.com/News/Article/CoStar-Study-Finds-Energy-Star-LEED-Bldgs-OutperformPeers/99818 (reporting that LEED-certified buildings "command rent premiums of $11.33 per
square foot over their non-LEED peers and have 4.1 percent higher occupancy"); Janet Frankston,
Emory University Sees 'Green' Building as Good Investment , ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 15, 2004, http://
www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-118628769/emory-university-sees-green.html ("Emory
spent an extra $570,000 to make its new Whitehead biomedical research building environmentally
friendly, but the university expects to get that money back within six years."); Green Buildings
Bring Higher Rental Rates, Burnham-Moores Center Study Finds , DAILY COM. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2008,
http://dcnonl.com/article/id26427.
26
Barnaby J. Federer, Environmentally Conscious Developers Try To Turn Green Into Platinum , N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/25/business/commercial-real-estateenvironmentally-conscious-developers-try-turn-green-into.html; see also Peter Lehner, Changing
Markets To Address Climate Change , 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 386-88 (2008) (discussing the
various ways that corporations have focused on becoming more responsible environmental
actors).
27
See, e.g. , Giant Eagle Becomes First LEED-Certified Supermarket in the U.S. Brunswick Store
Earns First Environmentally Friendly Supermarket Designation, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 22, 2004, http://
www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-18300784_TTM; Lake Champlain Chocolates
Opens LEED-Certified Packaging & Distribution Facility, Bus. WIRE, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.
businesswire.com/news/google/20060919005076/en; Office Depot To Build LEED-Certified Store ,
MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-172556560.html.
28
Building a Green Business Future, CABLE NEWS NETWORK, July 13, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/
BUSINESS/07/08/go.greenbuildings/index.html.
29
Id. The Staples store chain provides a more recent example. The company has refocused its
brand identity on environmental sustainability with the goal of attracting a broader consumer base
by building "brand equity over a long period of time." How Staples Is Building a Sustainable Brand,
BRANDWEEK, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.brandweek.com/bw/content_display/news-and-features/
direct/e3ib17430d49aa1ec38e9b3d409cb58faf9.
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ing sustainable building policies. 30 Within ten years of LEED's promulgation, more than thirty states had enacted policies to encourage or
mandate some form of green building. 31 Local governments have experienced a similar wave of green building momentum; in 2008 alone,
several hundred cities and municipalities implemented sustainable
construction policies . 32 Anchorage, Annapolis, Cambridge, and San
Francisco are just a few cities that now require certain construction
projects to comply with LEED standards. 33
Rhode Island is one of the states that has recently enacted a green
building statute. In November 2009, Governor Donald Carcieri signed
into law the Green Buildings Act, which provides that "[a]ll major
facility projects of public agencies shall be designed and constructed
to at least the LEED certified or an equivalent high performance green
building standard." 34 Rhode Island's law is similar to the green building statutes of other jurisdictions. 35
Another way that states have enacted green building policies is
through executive orders. Former Virginia Governor Tim Kaine, for
example, signed an executive order requiring all new government
buildings greater than 5,000 square feet to conform with LEED silver
certification standards. 36 Governors in Arizona, 37 Florida, 38 and other

Cf. Bronin, supra note 7, at 246-47 (discussing the various reasons why governments would
want to incorporate green building strategies into public projects).
31
See Government Resources , USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1779
(last visited Apr. 22, 2011) (noting that forty-five states have LEED initiatives); see also Bronin, supra
note 7, at 268 (discussing the financial incentives states have created to encourage sustainable
building initiatives); Stephen Del Percio, Revisiting Allied Tube and Noerr: The Antitrust Implications
of Green Building Legislation M Case Law Considerations for Policymakers , 34 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. &
POL'Y REv. 239, 239 (2009) ("Over the past five years, green building legislation has been enacted
across the country at the state and local levels with heightened frequency to combat what many
legislators and their constituents believe to be an imminent threat resulting from global climate
change."); cf. Perzan, supra note 6, at 43 ("The pace at which the development and adoption of the
green building standards has occurred is remarkable.").
32
See Kaplow, supra note 24, at 381 & n.38.
33
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUN. CODE tit. 23.05.050 (2008); ANNAPOLIS, MD., MUN. CODE tit. 17, ch.
17.14.040 (2010); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., MUN. CODE art. 22.000 (2010); S.F., CAL., BUILDING CODE ch.
13C, § 1303C101.3 (2010).
34 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 37-24-1 (Supp. 2010).
35
Oklahoma, for example, requires all public buildings over 10,000 square feet to follow LEED
guidelines or a similar green building standard. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 213 (2009). Similarly,
Washington requires all public projects, regardless of size, to "be designed, constructed, and
certified to at least the LEED silver standard." WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 39.35D.030 (West Supp.
2010).
36
Va. Exec. Order No. 82, June 10, 2009.
37
Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2005-05, Feb. 11, 2005 (requiring all state-funded buildings to achieve
LEED silver certification).
36
Fla. Exec. Order No. 07-126, July 13, 2007 (requiring all new public construction projects to
meet LEED platinum certification).
30
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states39 have issued similar orders directing new publicly-funded construction projects to achieve some form of LEED certification. 40
IV. DELEGATING LAWMAKING POWER TO THE USGBC
The states' recent flood of green policymaking is admirable, yet it is
also imperfect. As more states and localities rush to enact or strengthen
green building laws, legislators often overlook the importance of carefully constructing these statutes. Many governments, for example,
have passed laws that establish a system of penalties and incentives
for privately constructed buildings that achieve or fail to achieve LEED
certification. The problem with these statutes is that the LEED rating
system is created and updated by a non-governmental organization:
the USGBC. Thus, the USGBC has the power to alter a statutory scheme
that awards or penalizes citizens based on the LEED rating system. In
other words, the USGBC has the power to change the law .
Consider New Mexico's green building statute. It provides a "sustainable building tax credit" to all LEED-certified commercial and residential construction projects . 41 Commercial buildings that reach LEED
silver certification receive a $3.50 tax credit per square foot for the first
10,000 feet. 42 If the commercial building reaches platinum certification,
the tax credit nearly doubles. 43 The New Mexico statute provides an
See, e.g. , Ind. Exec. Order No. 08-14, June 24, 2008 (requiring all new state buildings to achieve
LEED silver certification); Mich. Exec. Order No. 2005-4, Apr. 22, 2005 (requiring all state-funded
construction to satisfy LEED guidelines); R.I. Exec. Order No. 05-14, Aug. 22, 2005 (requiring all
new construction and renovations of public schools to achieve LEED silver certification).
40
Relatedly, another author has suggested that there are "potential antitrust implications of
adopting the LEED rating system into state and local level legislation." Del Percio, supra note
31, at 242. This argument is rooted in the fact that LEED, like other rating systems, excludes
certain types of products, materials, and industries from its compliance requirements. Thus,
according to Del Percio, when governments require newly constructed buildings to receive LEED
certification, they "enshrin[e] these biases into legislation." Stephen T. Del Percio, Legal Issues
Arising Out of Green Building Legislation , ENTREPRENEUR, http://entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/
article/192452490_2.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). Although a full analysis of Del Percio's
argument is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that official government actions
are immune from antitrust liability even if they unreasonably restrain trade. Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 368 (1942); see also Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991);
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 579-80 (1984). The incorporation of LEED standards into state
law is a governmental action that would receive this immunity. And because government actions
are immune from antitrust liability, they cannot be used to buttress an antitrust claim against a
private organization, as Del Percio suggests. Private and public actions are siloed for the purpose
of antitrust analyses. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500
(1988) (holding that a Clayton Act plaintiff could receive damages for the anticompetitive actions
that a private organization performed when drafting a model electric code, but that "no damages
[may be] imposed for the incorporation of that Code by any government") (emphasis added); see
also Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining
that the Allied Court "specifically excluded from consideration any injury resulting from the adoption
of the challenged standards by any government and dealt only with the independent marketplace
effect of the defendant's conduct") (emphasis added).
41 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-18.19 (West Supp. 2010).
42
Id. § 7-2-18.19(C).
39

43

Id.
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even greater incentive to taxpayers constructing new residential properties: LEED silver buildings receive a $5.00 per square foot tax credit;
platinum certification is worth $9.00 per square foot. 44 Other state
green building statutes are similar to New Mexico's, and incentivize
or penalize private actors based on whether their construction projects
achieve a particular LEED rating 45
The District of Columbia's Green Building Act also deserves a brief
mention. 46 Starting in 2012, this Act will require all private development projects to furnish surety performance bonds to the District in an
amount up to $3 million . 47 If the project fails to achieve LEED certification, the bond is forfeited to the District as a penalty. 48 This statute
may establish the country's largest fiscal penalty for new construction
projects that do not comply with LEED standards. 49
The problem with these laws that operate contingently upon LEED
certification is that LEED standards change. 50 "As new methods of
recycling, materials reuse, and energy conservation are developed,
the design of green buildings will also change." 51 The USGBC frequently alters its rating system to reflect these new scientific advances. 52 Accordingly, what a building must accomplish to achieve LEED
certification varies from year to year. These variations de facto alter the
legal standards of green building laws that mandate LEED compliance.
Many states and localities, therefore, have delegated to the USGBC the
unencumbered power to change the law. Such delegations are not only
bad public policy, they are often unconstitutional.
44
45

Id. § 7-2-18.19(D).
See, e.g. , CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-217mm (Supp. 2010) (creating a tax credit for all "new construction

or major renovation of a building ... certified by the LEED Green Building Rating System"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 153A-340 (2010) (authorizing cities and counties to create fees and rebates for new
building construction projects in order to "encourage construction that uses sustainable design
principles"); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 1872 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (creating a "green residential
building program" that provides grants and "incentive payments" to residential building owners
who achieve certain LEED certifications); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221.2 (2010) (requiring localities
to tax energy efficient buildings at a lower rate).
46
D.C. CODE § 6-1451.01-6-1451.11 (2009).
47
Id. § 6-1451.05.
48
See id. See generally Chris Cheatham, White Paper: Revisions to Performance Bond Requirement of the
D.C. Green Building Act (2009), available at http://www.greenbuildinglawupdate.com/uploads/file/
DC%20White%20Paper%20FINAL%20PDF.pdf (discussing the virtues and vices of the District's
performance bond enforcement mechanism).
49
See Eujung Park, The U.S. Federal Green Building Policy, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 71, 71
(2007).
50 See Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry's LEED: Municipal Adoption of Private Green Building
Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285,344 (2010) ("The USGBC's LEED standards are not static.").
51
52

Id.
See LEED Rating System Development , USGBC, https://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile .

aspx?DocumentID=8447 ("The hallmark of LEED and its ability to affect market transformation
is its continuous improvement cycle that enables the rating system to increase in scope and
stringency as market readiness increases and new technologies become widely available.") (last
visited Apr. 26, 2011).
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
A. THE "WELL ESTABLISHED" RULE AGAINST PRIVATE DELEGATION
Ever since Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 53 courts have consistently
accepted the constitutionality of federal government delegations to
private actors . 54 The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, upheld the
constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 55 which
gave crop producers the power to block or approve federally recommended quotas. 56 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge to
the Davis-Bacon Act, 57 which required government contractors to pay
their workers an hourly wage at or above the rate that the local union
established. 58
State and local government delegations, by contrast, continue to
undergo searching judicial scrutiny. 59 Many state courts have invalidated private delegations that survived, or would survive, federal
court review. 60 The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, invalidated
the state's "Little Davis-Bacon Act," which charged a private commission with the responsibility of setting a wage rate that contractors on
state public works projects must pay their employees . 61 The court reasoned that "[i]t is a well established theory that a legislature may not
delegate its authority to private persons over whom the legislature has
no supervision or control." 62 Thus, because the legislature retained no
control over the commission's wage determinations, the statute was an
"unlawful delegation of legislative power." 63
53

298 U.S. 238, 311 (1935) (invalidating a statute that delegated power to producers and miners
to fix hours and wages because the delegation was "so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of
rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment").
54
But cf. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 560 (1997) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The Government is free, of course, to 'privatize' some functions it would otherwise
perform. But such privatization ought not automatically release those who perform government
functions from constitutional obligations.").
55
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407 (2006).
56
See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 43 (1939) (noting that a quota proclamation will not go into
effect if it is opposed by at least one-third of crop producers).
57
40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1982).
58
See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept. AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 712 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir.1983).
59 See, e.g. , FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) (declaring
unconstitutional portions of the Texas Water Code that delegated legislative powers to private
landowners).
60
Cf. A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN To Route Around the APA
and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 155-56 (2000) (observing that "the Supreme Court has had
no modern opportunities" to strengthen the private nondelegation doctrine since Carter Coal, but
noting that many state courts have "recently reaffirmed the importance of the doctrine").
61
Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. v. C & D Pipeline, Inc., 607 P.2d 383,384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
62 Id. at 385.
63
Id. at 386; see also Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 199 A.2d 266,
267-68 (Pa. 1964) ("Price regulatory power vests only in the elected legislative body. It may in
limited ways be delegated to other responsible governmental agencies, such as public service
or utility commissions .... However, it may not be delegated to private persons. The vesting
of a discretionary regulatory power over prices, rates or wages, in private persons violates the
essential concept of a democratic society and is constitutionally invalid."). But see Kenai Peninsula
Borough Sch. Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416,420 (Alaska 1977) ("While courts
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The Arizona Supreme Court decision is notable because it provided
no specific constitutional basis for invalidating the legislature's private
delegation. The court simply struck down the statute because it violated a "well established" rule against governmental delegations to
private actors. 64 This judicial approach is consistent with that of other
state courts, which rarely cite to a specific constitutional source when
invalidating private legislative delegations. 65 Rather, these courts are
wary of such delegations because private actors are politically unaccountable for the choices they make with the public power delegated
to them 66
Green building laws that require compliance with the LEED rating
system are thus not necessarily invalid because they violate a particular clause of a state constitution. Instead, the problem with such statutes is that they circumvent the principles of political accountability
that are essential to democratic governance. Put another way, these
green building laws may not directly violate a constitutional provision,
but they are so antithetical to democratic ideals that courts should not
let them stand.
This policy rationale makes sense. Members of the USGBC who create and promulgate the LEED standards are not public officials. They
are not elected by the public at large, appointed by a public official, or
employed by the government in any way. Nor are they subject to the
Freedom of Information Act or required to create their rating system
in the open, transparent process that society demands of state actors . 67
In short, LEED Steering Committee members have little or no accountability to the general public. 68 Their charge is simply to develop, mainin an earlier era often held laws unconstitutional on the ground that they delegated legislative
power to private persons or groups ... the trend has been to uphold such delegations, even when
the power is delegated to a group with an economic interest in the decisions to be made.").
64
Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. , 607 P.2d at 385; cf. Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (Va. 1930)
(stating that the rule prohibiting certain delegations of legislative power is predicated on "a
fundamental principle of our system of government").
65
See, e.g. , Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kueckelhan, 425 P.2d 669, 682 (Wash. 1967) (Hale, J., dissenting)
("The illegality consists ... in a violation of the constitution that designedly protects us from those
unspecified and unidentifiable hazards to self government lurking in a delivery of the powers of
government into the hands of private persons or corporations.").
66
Asmara Tekle Johnson, Privatizing Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very Public Power to
Private, Non-Profit, and Charitable Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 455, 462 (2005).
67 See Schindler, supra note 50, at 342-43; cf. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through
Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1304 (2003) ("Public law scholars worry that privatization
may enable government to avoid its traditional legal obligations, leading to an erosion of public
law norms and a systematic failure of public accountability.").
68
See Bronin, supra note 7, at 242 ("LEED is run by a non-profit organization with no accountability
to any level of government for changes that may occur in LEED standards over time."); see also
Dan Walters, Private Law Undercuts Democracy, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 6, 2007, at A3 ("[T]he
standards [the USGBC] decrees and the methods it uses to draft those decrees are matters of its
internal politics—including influence from those who support it financially—and are shielded
from input by the outside world.").
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tain, and update the LEED rating system, 69 not to do what is best for
"the people."
This lack of public accountability is the key problem with states
delegating some of their legislative function to the USGBC. As the
Texas Supreme Court described when striking down a statute giving a
private organization the power to levy fines:
[T]he private delegate may have a personal or pecuniary
interest which is inconsistent with or repugnant to the
public interest to be served. More fundamentally, the
basic concept of democratic rule under a republican
form of government is compromised when public
powers are abandoned to those who are neither
elected by the people, appointed by a public official
or entity, nor employed by the government. Thus, we
believe it axiomatic that courts should subject private
delegations to a more searching scrutiny than their
public counterparts. 7
In sum, poorly crafted green building laws can give the USGBC
unchecked public powers that defy the political objectives of democratic
governance.
'

B. STATE CONSTITUTION LEGISLATIVE VESTING CLAUSES
In addition to the "well established" rule against private delegation in the states, 71 some courts source their discontent for private delegations in constitutional provisions that vest lawmaking power in the
state legislature. 72 Virginia's constitution is typical: "[t]he legislative
power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Delegates." 73 The Supreme
Court of Virginia recently relied on this vesting clause when it struck
down a law delegating the power of taxation to an unelected body. 74
See USGBC: LEED Steering Committee , USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage .
aspx?CMSPageID=l636 (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
7 Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454,469 (Tex. 1997).
71
Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. v. C & D Pipeline, Inc., 607 P.2d 383,385 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
72
See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power , 61 IND. L.J. 647, 650 (1986).
Due process clauses of state constitutions are another source that courts use to limit private
delegations. The argument typically advanced is that "[i]f a delegation creates the opportunity
for private interest to dominate the use of governmental power, then those against whom the
power is used may well have suffered deprivations without due process." Id. at 661; see also
Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 334 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1960). Other courts source the unconstitutionality
of private delegations within principles of separation of powers. See, e.g. , Hous. Auth. of Dallas v.
Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. 1940).
73
VA. CONST. art. I, § 1; cf. CONN. CONsT. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of this state shall be
vested in two distinct houses or branches; the one to be styled the senate, the other the house of
representatives, and both together the general assembly.").
74 Marshall v. N. Va. Transp. Auth., 657 S.E.2d 71, 78-79 (Va. 2008) (holding that the vesting clause
of the Virginia Constitution permits delegation of taxing authority to only a legislative body of
elected officials).
69

'
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State constitutional vesting clauses reflect the democratic value that
"the people" have voluntarily submitted to the power of the legislature. 75 Thus, when the legislature transfers its lawmaking authority
to a private organization, the people become bound by laws to which
they did not voluntarily submit. 76 This transfer of lawmaking power is
precisely what many green building laws entail.
Importantly, state constitution vesting clauses do not prohibit legislatures from ever delegating their lawmaking power. Administrative
law is filled with examples of states constitutionally transferring some
of their authority to agencies that promulgate rules and regulations. 77
These delegations, however, are intragovernmental. Governments may
delegate their authority to subordinate agencies, offices, or municipalities without violating their state's vesting clause. 78 But when they delegate rulemaking authority to a non-governmental body such as the
USGBC, the legislative power transfers outside the transparent public
realm and into the opaque private realm. For that reason, private lawmaking delegations violate the vesting clause; public delegations do
not. 79
One example of the distinction between private and public delegations is Fink v. Cole . 80 There, New York passed a law that delegated to
a private association the discretionary power to "license owners, train^5

See JOHN LOcKE, TwO TREATISES Or GOVERNMENT 381-82 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1960) (1690) ("Political Power is that Power which every Man, having in the state of Nature,
has given up into the hands of the Society, and therein to the Governours, whom the Society hath
set over it self ...."); see also Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation , 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 4 (1982) ("Locke's insistence that legislators cannot delegate their legislative authority
derives from an ancient rule of agency law: power entrusted to an agent as a consequence of his
special fitness cannot be delegated, because such a delegation would be inconsistent with the
purposes of the initial transfer.").
76 See LOcxE, supra note 75, at 382-83 ("[The] power to make Laws ... has its Original only from
Compact and Agreement, and the mutual Consent of those who make up the Community."); see
also People ex rel. Chi. Dryer Co. v. City of Chicago,109 N.E.2d 201, 206 (^ll.1952) ("The legislature
cannot abdicate its functions or subject citizens and their interests to any but lawfully public
agencies, and a delegation of any sovereign power of government to private citizens cannot be
sustained nor their assumption of it justified.").
77
See generally Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine , 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1987)
(discussing the potential revival of the delegation doctrine).
78
E.g., Marshall, 657 S.E.2d at 79 ("The General Assembly may by special act delegate the power
of taxation to any county, city, town or regional government.").
79
This discussion of state vesting clauses is admittedly overly simplistic. Some state courts may
give the government leeway in delegating legislative power to the private sector or may place
restraints on the government's ability to delegate powers to subordinate government agencies.
The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example, allows the General Assembly to delegate legislative
power only if it also provides sufficient guidance for how to use such power. See, e.g. , Bell v. Dorey
Elec. Co., 448 S.E.2d 622, 623 (Va. 1994) ("[D]elegations of legislative power are valid only if they
establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official, agency, or board in the
exercise of the power."); Ames v. Town of Painter, 389 S.E.2d 702, 703-06 (Va. 1990) (requiring that
the Board's decision be supported by a record). Regardless, no state green building laws provide
any guidance to the USGBC, so these limited cases of acceptable delegation are inapposite.
80 97 N.E.2d 873 (N.Y. 1951).
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ers, and jockeys at steeplechases and hunts." 81 The New York Supreme
Court struck down the statute as an "unconstitutional relinquishment of legislative power" 82 because it created "essentially a sovereign
power" whose members were "neither chosen by, nor responsible to
the State government." 8 The court went on to explain, however, that
the legislature's delegation of this licensing power to a governmental
agency would survive vesting clause scrutiny. 84
Green building laws fail for the same reason as the statute in Fink:
they vest lawmaking power in a private group that is not politically
accountable to the general public. Fink is also illustrative because it
highlights an easy way for states and localities to avoid this constitutional repugnancy—namely, by delegating the power to establish green
building standards to a subordinate political agency rather than to the
USGBC.
'

VI. BRINGING GREEN BUILDING LAWS WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
None of this discussion is meant to suggest that governmental reliance on the private sector to assist with setting green building standards is per se unconstitutional. Indeed, utilizing standards that the
private sector develops can have substantial public policy benefits, not
the least of which is flexibility. Bureaucracy typically does not constrain private organizations in the same way as it does state and local
governments. 85 Free from this institutional bondage, private organizations can respond to scientific and technological advances in ways
that the government cannot. 86 Other policy advantages of using private
sector standards include reducing partisan political influence, utilizing
private expertise, and conserving limited public resources. 87
For these functional reasons, governments frequently turn to the
private sector to assist with lawmaking . 88 Many states, for example,
have legislatively adopted a version of the National Electric Code,
Id. at 874.
Id. at 876.
8'
Id.
'4 See id. (implying that, if the licensing power had been transferred to a governmental agency
instead of a private corporation, the delegation would not violate the state constitution's vesting
clause).
15
Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their
Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.165, 180 & n.76 (1989).
16
Lawrence, supra note 72, at 654-59; cf. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive:
Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government , 85 Nw. U.L.
RE^. 62, 85-86 (1990) (describing the ability to rely on the expertise of private groups as one
advantage of legislative delegation).
87
Abramson, supra note 85, at 179-81; see also Lawrence, supra note 72, at 656-57 ("The availability
of special expertise may continue as a reason for private delegation .... Persons with certain
kinds of expertise may be too expensive for government to employ or may prefer less structured
work environments than government can offer. Private delegation may be a practical method of
obtaining that sort of otherwise unavailable expertise.").
88
See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. RE^. 543, 546-49
(2000) (discussing the private sector's participation in governance).
81
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which is promulgated by a private association . 89 Similarly, most states
have enacted portions of the model codes drafted by the American
Law Institute or the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform
State Laws. Such adoptions turn "a technical and complex task often
quite beyond the competence of many city councils or even state legislatures over to a specialized private group." 90 And by adopting into
law the guidelines of a specialized trade association or think-tank, governments gain the work product of industry experts without spending
time or money to understand the intricacies of a specialized field or to
maneuver a technically complex bill through the legislative process.
These laws survive constitutional scrutiny only because they adopt
a particular version of a private organization's technical code. 91 This version-specific—or reproductive—adoption is different than an adoption
of any guidelines the organization may promulgate in the future. The
distinction is critical. 92 When state legislatures adopt a specific version of privately developed standards into law, they do not transfer any
future lawmaking power to the private sector. Such legislative action
is similar to passing a law that a lobbyist or concerned citizen drafted.
By contrast, when legislatures adopt a non-specific version of privately
developed standards, they de facto codify any and all future laws that
a lobbyist or citizen writes. The difference is who exercises the final
lawmaking power: the government must retain control over what standards ultimately become law.
Put within the context of green building policy, governments may
adopt statutes requiring builders to comply with "LEED version 2.1," 93
for example, but they may not adopt statutes requiring builders to comply with "LEED standards ."94 In other words, if states or localities
adopt a particular version of the LEED rating system, then they enact
into law a static, fixed set of rules, much like when they adopt a portion
of the most recent Model Penal Code. But by adopting "LEED standards" generally, governments enact no rules at all; rather, they enact a
dynamic set of guidelines that the USGBC may unilaterally alter in the
future. To remain on constitutionally firm footing, then, legislatures
19

See Lawrence, supra note 72, at 689 (describing the states' delegation of lawmaking power to the
National Fire Protection Agency).
90 Id.
91
E.g., State v. Crawford, 177 P. 360 (Kan. 1919).
92
This distinction may also explain why courts have declared wage reference statutes to be
unconstitutional delegations of lawmaking power. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
93
See, e.g. , CALABASAS, CAL., MUN. CODE tit. 17, § 17.34.010 (2010) ("The city will use the
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design rating system ... to assess the environmental
sensitivity of new structures in the city that is subject to this chapter. The Calabasas-LEED system
is the United States Green Building Council's LEED Rating System V^rsion 8.9 .") (emphasis added).
94
Statutes that require compliance with "LEED standards" may also be unlawfully vague. Cf.
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW 522-23 (2d ed. 2007) ("Building and development codes can be challenged on the
basis that they are so vague that they constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.").
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should avoid broad language requiring compliance with "LEED standards" and should instead require compliance with a specific version
of the LEED rating system.
But even this solution falls short of fully returning green building
laws to a healthy democratic process because it provides little opportunity for constituents to influence the substantive terms of the ultimate
policy. An even better legislative paradigm would be for governments
to use a particular LEED version as a model code and then amend those
green building standards to better reflect the interests of their constituents. 95 This method has the additional benefit of permitting legislatures
to consider the unique zoning, demographic, and geographic demands
of their jurisdictions when setting targets for sustainable construction. 96
By doing so, the government would design a unique green building
statute that uses the USGBC's expertise without deferring to the judgments of a private actor at the expense of an open, transparent, and
participatory lawmaking process . 97
CONCLUSION
Conceptually, green building laws are good public policy. They not
only promote environmental conservation, they also create jobs and
strengthen the long-term outlook of the economy. 98 But legislators must
carefully fashion these statutes. By requiring construction projects to
satisfy "LEED standards," some green building laws remove political
accountability, transparency, and legitimacy from the legislative process and unconstitutionally delegate public power to the private sector. In order to return these laws to sound constitutional footing, state
legislatures should delegate their standard-setting power to a public
agency, adopt into law a specific version of the LEED rating system, or
use the system as a starting point for the development of jurisdictionspecific green building policies. Only then can states reap the benefits
95

Cf. Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives To Promote Sustainable Construction and Green
Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State Land Use Policy Initiatives , 112 PENN

Sr. L. REv. 731, 763 (2008) (explaining that "LEED standards are only intended to be relevant
in limited circumstances," and noting that some green building policies are "unsuitable"
for all building codes); Kingsley, supra note 20, at 547-49 (explaining the downside of
inflexible green building standards, including a "negative effect[] on development").
96
An example of this "model code" approach is Indianapolis, Indiana, which permits developers
to receive a 30 percent rebate if they incorporate certain green building technologies, yet does not
require compliance with the full ambit of LEED standards. Indianapolis Green Building Incentive
Policy, INDY.GOv, Aug. 1, 2010, http://www.indy.gov/eGov/City/DCE/Documents/Indianapolis%20
Green%20Building%20Incentive%20Policy%20-%20Updated%208-01-10.pdf.
97 Cf. Schindler, supra note 50, at 342 ("Encouraging local governments to design their own green
building regimes, which take into account their own localities' concerns and desires, will help
to achieve the regime goal of legitimate process, resulting in greater public notice, incentive to
participate, and voice.").
96
See, e.g. , Press Release, USGBC, New Study: Green Building To Support Nearly 8 Million U.S.
Jobs Over Next 4 Years (Nov. 11, 2009) ("[G]reen building will support 7.9 million U.S. jobs and
pump $554 billion into the American economy ... over the next four years.").
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of sustainable construction without compromising the democratic values that underlie the American system of government.

